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Bill Brewer
Persisting macroscopic material objects play a fundamental role in our commonsense 
understanding of the world around us. I offer a characterization of one central aspect 
of this role and elaborate a conception of such objects themselves that I argue is essential 
to their playing it. I conclude that the objects that play this fundamental explanatory 
role meet the conception that I elaborate.
The explanatory role that I identify concerns the way in which we appeal to the 
ordinary objects that are presented to us in perception in understanding the actual and 
counterfactual course and nature of our perceptual experience of them from different 
points of view over time. The complementary conception of such objects themselves 
that I am concerned with draws a crucial distinction between Natural Continuants, 
on the one hand, whose unity, both at a time and over time, is entirely independent 
of our concepts, and Artificial Continuants, on the other hand, which are grounded 
upon Natural Continuants and unified in part by various concepts of spatial and 
temporal partition, collection, and approximation. A key claim linking the two is 
that Natural Continuants occupy their precise spatial extent exclusively: if o and o’ 
are Natural Continuants and there is a time at which they precisely occupy the same 
spatial extent, then o = o’. Artificial Continuants fail this Exclusivity condition, both 
amongst themselves, and with Natural Continuants.
In section 1, I elaborate this conception of persisting macroscopic material objects 
that I call the Natural Continuants View (NCV).1 I explain in section 2 how NCV 
sustains a fundamental explanatory role for such objects in connection with our 
perceptual experience of them that I claim is central to our understanding of the mind-
independence of the very objects that we perceive. In section 3 I argue that NCV is 
essential to supporting this explanatory role by considering the explanatory obstacles 
encountered by objects of perception that fail the Exclusivity condition characteristic 
1 Inspired by Michael Ayers (1974,  1991a,  1991b), I develop and defend NCV in a series of papers 
(Brewer 2015, 2017, and forthcoming).
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of its basic Natural Continuants. Section 4 considers a series of objections to my 
argument and to my conclusion that NCV is essential to the role of objects in the 
explanation of perception.
1. The Natural Continuants View
NCV claims that there are Natural Continuants: persisting macroscopic material 
objects that are wholly naturally unified, both at a time and over time. Their unity at 
a  time and over time is entirely independent of our concepts and activities. They 
are  characterized by the following condition that I call Exclusivity: if o and o’ are 
Natural Continuants and there is a time at which they precisely occupy the same 
spatial extent, then o = o’.2
I take plausible examples of Natural Continuants to include individual animals, 
vegetables and (unified portions of) minerals, though even our best hypotheses as to 
Natural Continuant status may be subject to correction in the light of further investi-
gation. First, there are naturally occurring things, such as (a) a cat that is conceived, 
grows inside its mother and is born, lives an active life, perhaps losing a tail along the 
way, dies and eventually disintegrates by decomposition; (b) an acorn that falls from an 
oak, sprouts in the ground and grows to become a grand old oak that is finally destroyed 
by loggers; and (c) a rock that detaches and falls from a cliff, gradually eroding to 
become a small pebble and perhaps even a grain of sand on the beach before vanishing 
altogether. Second, there are also human-made Natural Continuants, such as (d) a coin, 
minted and much used, discarded out of circulation, battered and bent, used as a tool to 
open tins, and winding up in a museum collection before finally melting away in a fire.
Four-dimensional perdurants, on the other hand, fail the Exclusivity condition. 
For, in the sense in which there is one persisting such thing precisely occupying a given 
spatial extent at a given time, there are many that all share the temporal part 
that  is  more  strictly there then. Thus, NCV is intended to be incompatible with 
four-dimensionalism.3
NCV further claims that Natural Continuants metaphysically ground Artificial 
Continuants by partition, collection, and approximation. The idea is that Artificial 
Continuants are unified at a time and over time, on the basis of a more fundamental 
domain of Natural Continuants, at least in part by our conceptual delineation. Such 
derivative unification operates in various ways, including the spatial and temporal 
partitioning of a Natural Continuant by our designation of a sub-region of its spatial 
extent or a temporary role that it plays, say; our collection of appropriately related or 
2 As it stands, this is simply a necessary condition for Natural Continuant status. Conjoined with 
the stipulation that o and o’ are both persisting macroscopic material objects I intend Exclusivity to be 
sufficient. Although I have no precise definition of persisting macroscopic material objects, I would begin 
by giving paradigm examples such as stones, tables, trees, and animals.
3 I understand the idea of a persisting macroscopic material object precisely occupying a spatial extent 
in this way throughout.
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functionally similar Natural Continuants at a time or over time; and our approximation 
of the overall behaviour of a coordinated assemblage of Natural Continuants to that 
of a single such thing. These modes of grounding by what might be called ‘artificial 
unification’ may also be combined.
Artificial Continuants fail Exclusivity, both amongst themselves and with Natural 
Continuants. There may be Artificial Continuants a and a’ such that there is a time at 
which they precisely occupy the same spatial extent, yet a ≠ a’; and there may be an 
Artificial Continuant a and a Natural Continuant o such that there is a time at which 
they precisely occupy the same spatial extent, yet a ≠ o. This is possible in their case, in 
contrast with the Exclusivity characteristic within the Natural Continuants, because 
Artificial Continuants’ basic properties are simply derived from their grounding 
Natural Continuants.
Examples of what I take to be Artificial Continuants according to NCV include 
arbitrary conceptually delineated spatial parts of Natural Continuants, such as (a) the 
whole of Tibbles the cat except for his tail; and conceptually delineated temporal parts 
of Natural Continuants, such as (b) the statue constituted for a time by a lump of clay—
that clay whilst-it-is-a-statue. Artificial Continuants also include appropriately related 
collections of Natural Continuants, such as (c) a chess set; and coordinated assem-
blages of Natural Continuants, such as (d) a watch. It is crucial in all these cases, 
though, to recognize that these are indeed Artificial and not Natural Continuants.4
2. The Explanation of Perception
We think of our perceptual experience as the joint upshot of what is there in the 
world around us and our changing point of view upon it as we move through the world 
over time. Not only are we right to do so; but this is arguably the key to our understand-
ing of the mind-independence of the very things that we perceive.5 It is by thinking of 
the actual course of our experience as jointly explained by what is there anyway in 
the world and our changing perspective upon it that we appreciate the fact that the 
very things that we perceive exist, and are as they are, entirely independently of our 
experience of them.
Recall Berkeley’s (1975a, 1975b) central challenge to Locke’s (1975) realism about 
the physical world. If we think of our perceptual experience, as both Locke and 
Berkeley did, as the simple unstructured presence of certain direct objects, then the 
unperceived existence of those very objects is unintelligible. For their presence is 
simultaneously their existence and their being perceived. There is nothing more nor 
less to their existence than their being perceived. The theoretical choice at that point is 
4 See my (2015, 2017, and forthcoming), for extended elaboration and defense of NCV.
5 This focus on what has been called a ‘simple theory of perception’ as the source of our understanding 
of the mind-independence of the very things that we encounter in perception is a prominent theme in 
Strawson (1959, ch. 3;  1966, ch. 2.II), Evans (1980,  1982, ch. 7), Peacocke (1983, ch. 3;  1992, ch. 3), 
Campbell (1984–5, 1993), Cassam (1989, 1997), Eilan (1997), and Brewer (1992, 1999, ch. 6; 2011, ch. 7).
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very stark. On the one hand, one may adopt some form of idealism, according to which 
physical objects are indeed the very things that we are directly acquainted with in 
perception, whose existence must therefore be tied in some way to perception (to their 
being perceived, actually, by us or by God; or to the possibility of certain perceptions 
of  them under various counterfactual conditions). On the other hand, one might 
introduce physical objects as some kind of theoretical postulate quite distinct from 
the objects of our acquaintance, whose intrinsic nature is therefore irremediably 
mysterious to us, that surely justify Berkeley’s accusation to Locke of having plainly 
changed the subject.
Thankfully, this stark choice is not obligatory. We must reject the conception of 
perceptual experience as a simple unstructured presence of its direct objects. 
Perceptual presence as such is an essentially structured phenomenon: the evident joint 
upshot of what is there anyway and our meeting the spatio-temporal and other enab-
ling conditions on its perception. The perceived existence of the physical objects 
around us is manifestly the product of two independent factors: (i) what is there to be 
perceived and (ii) our contingent spatio-temporal route through it (along with our 
changing attention and other enabling conditions of perception). The first of these 
may exist, exactly as it is, in the absence of any experience of it, by us, or indeed by 
anyone else. For our, and their, spatio-temporal route may simply fail to enable percep-
tion of it. Nevertheless, when our spatio-temporal route and other conditions do enable 
our perception of certain physical objects, it is precisely these and nothing else that are 
presented to us in experience. Thus, the familiar physical objects that we encounter 
directly in perception are themselves entirely independent of our perception of them. 
We register this joint dependence of what we are presented with in perception upon 
what is there to be perceived anyway and our changing perspective upon it in giving 
the explanations that we do of our experience in precisely these terms; and it is this 
understanding of the nature of our experience over time that sustains our conception 
of the very things that we perceive as entirely independent of our perception of them.
In particular, I understand my current perceptual condition, conscious acquaint-
ance with that thing there before me, as the joint upshot of (i) its being there, just as it 
is, entirely independent of me and my experience, and (ii) my being suitably placed, 
attentive, and otherwise enabled to perceive it. Likewise, I recognize that what I am 
currently presented with in experience has an extended life of its own in the sense that, 
given any specific trajectory that it takes over time, whether or not I previously encoun-
tered that very thing in perception, or will do so again in the future, or would do so 
in certain counterfactual circumstances, is uniquely determined by my own spatio- 
temporal route through the world along with my satisfaction of the relevant attentional 
and other enabling conditions of its perception. I call this condition Explanatory 
Determinacy, ED.6
6 It is essential to the current strategy in response to Berkeley’s challenge that it is the basic condition of 
conscious perceptual acquaintance itself—simply having the perceptual experience in question—that is 
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NCV sustains ED. Its basic Natural Continuants are perceptible macroscopic material 
objects that are unified, both at a time and over time, entirely independently of our 
concepts, and that exclusively occupy their precise spatial extent at any time according 
to the Exclusivity condition. Thus, perception of Natural Continuants at a time presents 
us directly with the unique and determinate explanatory grounds of our changing 
experience of those very things from different points of view over time. Suppose that 
I am now perceiving Natural Continuant o. Given Exclusivity, the only Natural 
Continuant presented in my experience just there before me is o.7 It persists and takes a 
certain trajectory through space over time. Given that, whether I previously perceived o, 
will do so again, or would do so in various counterfactual circumstances, is uniquely 
determined by my own actual and counterfactual spatio-temporal route through the 
world (in conjunction with the relevant attentional and other enabling conditions of 
perception). Thus ED obtains.8 So NCV offers an account of our perception of the most 
basic material objects in the world around us that straightforwardly sustains the 
explanatory project that in turn supports our conception of the mind-independence of 
those very things.
In what follows I argue that the Exclusivity characteristic of NCV Natural 
Continuants is crucial to this fundamental explanatory role, and therefore also crucial 
to our appreciation of the mind-independence of the objects that we perceive in 
the world around us. I do this by considering the explanatory consequences of our 
perception of phenomena that manifestly fail the Exclusivity condition.
3. The Importance of Exclusivity
Suppose that I am sitting in the Royal Festival Hall (RFH) watching and listening to the 
Philharmonia Orchestra. There are many distinct events taking place before me that 
precisely occupy the same spatial extent right now. The Philharmonia are playing 
the first movement of Beethoven’s Third Symphony; they are also playing bar 47, the 
first movement exposition, and the whole symphony. They are performing a cycle of 
Beethoven symphonies that travels across Europe over the course of a week. They are 
playing the recorded version of the Eroica that cuts together most of tonight’s perform-
ance with the Funeral March from a studio session tomorrow. I am also witnessing the 
week-long event in which all of the Beethoven symphonies are being performed by a 
succession of different orchestras in the Festival Hall and the longer event of which that 
evidently the structured joint upshot of what is presented in that very experience along with the relevant 
spatio-temporal and other enabling conditions of its perception. This point will be crucial in my response 
to the sortalist objection in §4.2.1 below.
7 See §4 below for discussion of a complication introduced by the fact that some Natural Continuants 
have Natural Continuants as proper spatial parts. I ignore this complication until then.
8 See below for consideration of the dependent role of NCV Artificial Continuants in the explanation of 
our perception of them.
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is a part consisting of performances throughout London over a month of all of 
Beethoven’s works. And these are just a few of the events that are taking place in that 
very space before me right now: most would take much longer to identify.
Events such as these clearly fail the Exclusivity condition characteristic of Natural 
Continuants according to NCV. The Philharmonia’s performance of Beethoven 3, their 
Europe-wide Beethoven cycle and the RFH multi-orchestra cycle are all happening in 
exactly the same place before me now. Yet these are plainly distinct events. Indeed, this 
precise collocation at a time of multiple distinct nested entities is characteristic of 
events quite generally. Their unity, both at a time and over time depends significantly 
upon our conceptual articulation into distinct individuals of various different kinds.
Consider just three of the distinct musical events that precisely occupy the same 
spatial extent in the Festival Hall before me now: the Philharmonia’s performance of 
Beethoven 3, their Europe-wide Beethoven cycle and the RFH multi-orchestra cycle. 
The experiential implications of various spatio-temporal routes through the world are 
quite different in connection with each of these. Remaining seated where I am, there is 
nothing left of the first to hear after fifty minutes or so; and I will miss all that remains 
of the second, however long I sit there; but I will hear successive Beethoven symphony 
instalments of the third, involving different orchestras on different nights. On the 
other hand, a well chosen route through the concert halls of other European cities over 
a week will enable me to hear the whole of the Philharmonia cycle, although I will hear 
nothing more of their performance of the Eroica after fifty minutes in the Festival Hall, 
when it is no more; and I will miss successive instalments of the multi-orchestra 
London cycle.
So ED breaks down in this case. A given experiential encounter alone, and a given 
spatio-temporal route alone, are experientially indeterminate. These must be sup-
plemented by one amongst many possible conceptual articulations of a unique 
individual event encountered in perception if the explanation is to yield determinate 
results over time.9
We assume at any given time that the very things that we encounter in perception, 
that are consciously presented to us in experience there and then, are a significant 
determinant of our experience of them, both at that time and over time as we vary 
our spatial perspective upon them. According to the proposal currently under consid-
eration, this assumption is a crucial part of the pattern of thinking by which we register 
the mind-independence of those very things in the world around us that we do 
encounter in perception. Yet it is truly explanatory only if the idea of what we encoun-
ter before us in perception at any given time uniquely identifies a single individual 
determinant of our experience from different points of view over time. This condition 
9 Given such conceptual articulation, of course, determinacy returns. But ED requires determinacy 
simply on the basis of what is delineated in conscious perception itself: how things are for the subject in 
being presented with the world around him in perception. Again, see §4.2.1 for further discussion of this 
condition.
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clearly fails in the case of the musical events that I encounter before me now in the 
Festival Hall.
ED also fails in connection with the Artificial Continuants of NCV that likewise 
fail  the Exclusivity condition, both amongst themselves and in relation to Natural 
Continuants. Suppose that a small lump of clay is made into an abstract-shaped statue 
by a sculptor and then lost. It is subsequently found by someone who uses it unchanged 
as a doorstop. I see it lying on the floor before me now. Suppose further that its form 
will shortly be changed in such a way that it improves in its continued use as a door-
stop, although it loses the crucial proportions integral to its maker’s intentions in the 
creation of her statue.
According to NCV there is a single persisting Natural Continuant present through-
out: a single lump of clay, c, that changes its shape and role over time. Its individual 
unity at a time and over time is entirely independent of our concepts; and it satisfies the 
Exclusivity condition in connection with other such Natural Continuants. Given any 
particular role, R, that it happens to take on, such as being a statue or being used to 
hold open a door, we may consider a dependent Artificial Continuant, c whilst it is R, 
which is artificially unified on the basis of c by the temporal partition induced by R. 
Call this Artificial Continuant [c, R]. This will be coincident with c whilst c is R in a way 
that is not possible for Natural Continuants, since its basic properties are simply 
derived from those of c itself.
Once we include such Artificial Continuants as well as Natural Continuants, the 
explanatory determinacy that I claim is crucial to our understanding of the mind-
independence of the objects that we encounter in experience is lost. I now have before 
me c, [c Statue] and [c, Doorstop]. Before someone had the bright idea of using c to 
hold open a door, one of these, [c, Doorstop], had not yet come to be, so could plainly 
not be perceived in any way, although I could still have seen both c and [c, Statue]. 
Prior to the sculptor’s intervention, only c was there to be seen. After the modification 
that will shortly be made, [c, Statue] will be no more; c and [c, Doorstop] will be there 
to be seen. If c were subsequently squashed down into a flat disc, incapable of holding 
open any door, then all that would remain to be seen would be c itself: [c, Doorstop], 
too, would be no more. So, if it is allowed to apply to both Natural and Artificial 
Continuants, the basic idea of what I currently see before me varies dramatically in its 
experiential implications at other times: conjoined simply with the idea of my spatio-
temporal route through the world, it has no determinate experiential explanatory impli-
cations as to its past, future, or counterfactual perceptual presence. According to ED, on 
the other hand, given any specific trajectory taken over time by what I perceive before me 
now, my own spatio-temporal route through the world uniquely determines (in con-
junction with my satisfaction of the relevant attentional and other enabling conditions 
on perception) whether or not I previously encountered that very thing in perception, or 
will do so again in the future, or would do so in certain counterfactual circumstances.
Perception alone is incapable of separating collocated (Natural and Artificial) 
Continuants. Yet ED requires that perception itself should evidently present us with 
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the determinate explanatory grounds of our various experiences of such things from 
different points of view at different times. Only so is it correct to insist on the charac-
terization of our experience as the structured joint upshot of what is there anyway in 
the world and our spatio-temporal route through it over time.10 The only way to retain 
ED, and hence the proposed response to Berkeley’s challenge, is therefore to restrict 
the fundamental application of the idea of what I encounter in perception at any time 
to the basic Natural Continuants that meet the Exclusivity condition.
Of course, we understand perfectly well the mind-independence of the various 
events and Artificial Continuants that we encounter in perception. My point is that this 
understanding depends upon a more basic understanding of the mind-independence 
of the Natural Continuants upon which such events and Artificial Continuants them-
selves depend: c in the case of the statue and doorstop above; and the individual players 
involved in the various performance events considered previously. Furthermore, this 
basic understanding of the mind-independence of Natural Continuants is sustained 
by patterns of explanation, and by ED in particular, that essentially exploit their char-
acteristic Exclusivity. Thus, NCV is absolutely crucial to the current account of our 
understanding quite generally of the mind-independence of the very objects that we 
encounter directly in perception.
4. Objections and Replies
I have argued that NCV is essential to our understanding of the mind-independence of 
the objects that we encounter in perception. §4.1 enumerates a sequence of concerns 
about the argument that I do not consider further here; §§4.2–4.4 respond to a further 
series of objections that I consider more pressing.
4.1 Mind-Independence and Explanation
It is certainly a fundamental feature of our common-sense conception of the world 
that the very objects that we encounter in perception are entirely independent of our, 
or indeed anyone else’s, perception of them. What we perceive is there to be perceived 
anyway, whether we perceive it or not. Berkeley is absolutely right in my opinion at 
least to challenge this conviction. For how do we actually make sense of the possibility 
that the very things that we encounter directly in our experience might exist and be 
exactly as they are in the absence of any such experience of them? The starting point 
of my argument is the claim that this understanding is sustained by our practice (nor-
mally correctly) of explaining the course and nature of our perceptual experience as 
the joint upshot of what is there to be perceived in the world around us and our chan-
ging point of view upon it as we move through the world over time. It may be objected 
right at the outset, though, that, although we happen to go in for such explanations, 
10 Once again see §4.2.1 for further development of these ideas in connection with an objection from 
sortalism.
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our doing so, and indeed the normal correctness of the explanations of this form that 
we give, are quite inessential to our understanding of the mind-independence of what 
we perceive. So my argument does not even get off the ground. Concern may arise 
every step of the way.
First, one might reject the Berkeleyian challenge outright. Perception simply does 
present the constituents of the world around us as independent of our experience of 
them. This is a datum in need of no explanation. There remains a sceptical question 
concerning whether and how our beliefs in taking such experience at face value 
attain the status of knowledge; but there is a range of familiar, more or less plausible 
approaches to this issue. Nothing deeper is required by way of understanding 
how   perception presents us with a world of objects that are independent of that 
very experience.
Second, one might accept the challenge to explain the fact that perception presents 
the constituents of the world around us as independent of our experience of them, but 
deny that this should be done by any appeal to the contrast between a simple, unstruc-
tured notion of perceptual presence and a structured conception on which this should 
be understood as the joint upshot of what is there to be perceived and our contingent 
spatio-temporal route through the world (along with our changing attention and other 
enabling conditions of perception). An alternative explanation might be given instead, 
for example, by appeal to the evolution of neural mechanisms realizing various robust 
perceptual constancies.11
Third, one might accept, both the Berkeleyian challenge and the Evansian response 
in terms of a ‘simple theory of perception’ (Evans 1980, 1982, ch. 7), but deny that this 
response is necessarily to be implemented by appeal to perceivers’ own actual engage-
ment with various patterns of explanation of the course and nature of their perceptual 
experience in accord with the simple theory of perception. As theorists, we may 
respond to Berkeley’s challenge by appeal to the idea that perceivers’ experience of 
particular objects in the world around them is the joint upshot of those very things 
being there anyway, independently of any such experience, and the satisfaction of 
various spatio-temporal and other enabling conditions upon their perception. This 
theoretical truth explains the datum, for all of us, that perception presents the con-
stituents of the world around us as independent of our experience of them, without 
placing any explicit requirements, explanatory or otherwise, upon theoretically 
uninterested perceivers.
Fourth, one might supplement the third response above with the idea that, over the 
course of their development and active exploration of the world over time, perceivers 
themselves inevitably acquire an increasingly sophisticated conception of the objects 
that they perceive as independent of their perception of them without ever necessarily 
11 See in particular Burge (2010), for a very well worked out development of an account along these 
lines.
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turning explicitly to the question of the correct explanation of the course and nature 
of their experience itself.
Fifth, one might accept the Berkeleyian challenge, the Evansian response, and the 
idea that this depends upon some recognition on the part of perceivers themselves that 
the course and nature of their perceptual experience is to be explained by appeal to the 
mind-independent constituents of the perceived world and their own spatio-temporal 
route through the world and other enabling conditions of perception, but insist that 
such explanations are ultimately to be given in fundamental physical terms that make 
no explicit reference to the persisting macroscopic material objects that we encounter 
directly in our perceptual experience. Commonsense explanations appealing to such 
things are inessential placeholders for the correct explanations that proceed instead in 
quite different terms.
Sixth, and finally, one might accept the Berkeleyian challenge, the Evansian 
response, and the idea that this depends upon perceivers’ common-sense explanation 
of the course and nature of their perceptual experience as the joint upshot of the 
distribution and nature of the very material objects that they perceive and their own 
spatio-temporal route through the world and other enabling conditions of perception. 
Still one might deny that such explanations must conform to ED, the condition that, 
given any specific trajectory that a direct object of perception takes over time, whether 
or not that very thing was previously encountered in perception, or will be so again 
in  the future, or would be so in certain counterfactual circumstances, is uniquely 
determined by one’s own spatio-temporal route through the world along with the 
satisfaction of the relevant attentional and other enabling conditions of its perception.
All of these possibilities raise serious and controversial issues that I cannot possibly 
address here.12 As indicated above, I myself accept the Berkeleyian challenge, the 
Evansian response, and the idea that this depends upon perceivers’ common-sense 
explanation of their experience in accordance with ED. What follows is not without 
interest even to those who part company with this approach as just indicated or for any 
other reason. For we all do give the kinds of explanations of our experience that I take 
to be so central to our understanding of the mind-independence of the objects that we 
encounter in perception; and we take these to be at least approximately correct. The 
very objects that we perceive are the explanatory grounds of our changing experiences 
of them over time as we take the route that we do through the world that they constitute 
and in which we find ourselves. So the conditions on the coherence and correctness 
of such explanations are of quite general interest.
4.2 Explanation and Exclusivity
The next move in my argument is the claim that the determinate success of our explan-
ations of the nature of our experience on the basis of the objects that we perceive 
12 I discuss the fifth response at length in chapter 7 of my (2011); and the position considered in §4.2.1 
below may be construed as a variant of the sixth.
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and our route through the world over time depends upon the Exclusivity that is 
characteristic of NCV Natural Continuants. I consider in §4.2.1 and §4.2.2 below, two 
variants of the objection that ED is instead perfectly compatible with the failure of 
Exclusivity amongst the persisting mind-independent objects of perception.
4.2.1 Sortalism
Recall the situation in the Royal Festival Hall as I sit listening to the Philharmonia 
playing Beethoven 3. There are many events going on in exactly the same place before 
me at that time. These include at least the following: the Philharmonia’s performance 
of Beethoven 3; their performance of its first movement; their Europe-wide Beethoven 
cycle and the RFH multi-orchestra cycle of Beethoven symphonies. This is simply 
an instance of the failure of Exclusivity for events. Still, it may be claimed that ED in 
relation to the course of my experience may be reinstated simply by a judicious appeal 
to appropriate event-sortal categories in my identification of the relevant explanantia. 
Thus, after fifty minutes or so, remaining in the Festival Hall, I will hear no more of this 
performance of Beethoven 3, and will be in the wrong place to hear the subsequent parts 
of this Philharmonia cycle of Beethoven symphonies; I will nevertheless hear subsequent 
parts of this Festival Hall Beethoven cycle, starting in just under 24 hours with the 
4th symphony played by the London Symphony Orchestra. Similarly, provided that 
I take the right route through Europe’s major concert halls, I will catch all that remains 
of this Philharmonia cycle of Beethoven symphonies, although I will miss the remainder of 
this Festival Hall Beethoven cycle, including the finale performance of the 9th  symphony 
by the Berlin Phil. Introducing appropriate musical event categories in this way  preserves 
perfect determinacy in these explanations of the course of my experience over time on 
the basis of what is there to be perceived and my route through the world.
Resolving the ambiguity in the notion of what I encounter in perception by appeal 
to an appropriate sortal category in this way reinstates ED in the face of the failure of 
Exclusivity.13 Given any specific trajectory taken over time by the performance of the 
relevant kind that I perceive before me now, my own spatio-temporal route through the 
world uniquely determines (in conjunction with my satisfaction of the relevant atten-
tional and other enabling conditions on perception) whether or not I previously 
encountered that very thing in perception, or will do so again in the future, or would 
do so in certain counterfactual circumstances. So sortalism blocks the argument from 
ED to Exclusivity.
The same applies to NCV Artificial Continuants. Before me now stand c, [c Statue], 
and [c, Doorstop]. Given its trajectory over time, my past, future, and counterfactual 
experience of c depend simply on my own spatio-temporal route through the world 
and other relevant enabling conditions. Similarly, given their trajectories, my experi-
ence of [c Statue] and of [c, Doorstop] likewise depends simply on their appropriately 
13 This appeal to sortalism is motivated by Wiggins’ seminal work on material substance 
(1967, 1980, 2001).
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enabling intersection with my own spatio-temporal route. Provided that the relevant 
sortal categories are included in my characterization of both my past, future, and 
counterfactual experience and what I now encounter in perception, then the ED 
explanatory scheme by which I understand my experience at any time as the joint 
upshot of what is there to be perceived and my spatio-temporal route through the 
world remains in place. So, once again, sortalism blocks the argument for Exclusivity.
In reply to this line of objection I argue that the proposed sortalist reinstatement of 
ED is inconsistent with the fundamental role of ED in response to Berkeley’s challenge. 
The sortalist proposal in this context also faces serious problems on its own terms. 
I take these two points in turn.
Recall Berkeley’s challenge to Locke. If we think of our perceptual experience as the 
simple unstructured presence of certain direct objects, then the unperceived existence 
of those very objects is unintelligible. For their presence is simultaneously their exist-
ence and their being perceived. There is nothing more nor less to their existence than 
their being perceived. As we saw above, the theoretical choice at that point is very stark: 
idealism with mind-dependent physical objects, or indirect realism with postulated 
mind-independent physical objects distinct from any objects of our acquaintance. The 
solution is to reject the conception of perceptual experience as a simple unstructured 
presence of its direct objects. Perceptual presence as such is an essentially structured 
phenomenon: the evident joint upshot of what is there anyway and our meeting the 
spatio-temporal and other enabling conditions on its perception. ED is a condition on 
implementing this solution. We must understand what is presented to us in experience 
at any time as having an extended life of its own in the sense that, given any specific 
trajectory that it takes over time, whether or not I previously encountered that very 
thing in perception, or will do so again in the future, or would do so in certain counter-
factual circumstances, is uniquely determined by my own spatio-temporal route 
through the world along with my satisfaction of the relevant attentional and other 
enabling conditions of its perception.
The key idea here for present purposes is that its role in responding to Berkeley 
requires that ED applies directly to perceptual presentation itself. According to the 
conception proposed in response to his challenge, perceptual presentation is evidently 
in itself the structured joint upshot of what is presented in that very experience along 
with the relevant spatio-temporal and other enabling conditions on perception. Thus, 
such experience, taken entirely on its own, presents to the subject the explanatory 
ground of alternative experiences from different points of view at different times as 
such. So ED requires determinacy in experiential implications simply on the basis of 
what is delineated in conscious perception itself: how things are for the subject in being 
presented with the world around him in perception.
According to the proposed sortalism, on the other hand, ED is reinstated only on 
the basis of an additional essential role for sortal concepts in distinguishing amongst 
collocated worldly phenomena that are purely perceptually indistinguishable at the time. 
So this fails as an implementation of the proposed ED response to Berkeley’s challenge.
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Furthermore, the involvement of sortal categorization at just this point in the 
overall view brings problems of its own. In the sense that I have just explained, this 
makes the world of mind-independent physical objects inaccessible purely on the basis 
of our perceptual experience. We attain cognitive contact with the mind-independent 
world as such on this view, if at all, only on the basis of an application to the direct 
deliverances of perception of a theoretical sortal categorization of its elements. But 
with what right can the account claim that what is thereby categorized as falling under 
one sortal concept or another is genuinely a collection of mind-independent things? 
For perception alone provides us with no domain of such entities as the subject matter 
of sortal categorization. Similarly, what are we supposed to make of the perceptual 
experience of infants prior to the acquisition of the relevant sortal concepts? This 
likewise fails to present them with a world of persisting mind-independent things. The 
situation is quite different according to NCV. For, on this view, perception itself evi-
dently acquaints us, directly and unaided, with a domain of mind-independent physical 
objects that constitutes the subject matter of our developing theoretical categorization 
on the basis of education and sustained experiment and observation over time.14
The sortalist objector certainly has a point. There are ED explanations to which the 
discrimination and conceptual articulation of non-Exclusive objects of perception 
are  essential. But this fails to undermine my argument. For these more complex 
explanations are themselves dependent upon a more basic level of experiential explan-
ation and understanding of the objects that we perceive whose determinacy crucially 
exploits the Exclusivity that is characteristic of NCV Natural Continuants.
4.2.2 Reference Magnetism
I am considering attempts to conjoin the satisfaction of ED by our simple explanations 
of the course of our perceptual experience by appeal to the worldly objects that we 
perceive and our continuous spatio-temporal route through them with the denial of the 
Exclusivity of the most basic of such perceptible worldly objects that is characteristic 
of NCV Natural Continuants. The only alternative to sortalism that I can see here is 
to invoke the notion of reference magnetism (Lewis, 1983, 1984). The basic idea is that 
the world may often contain multiple candidates for reference in thought and talk that 
are all equally qualified in respect of the constraints operative within the subject’s 
perspective. Nevertheless, the tie between them may be broken by purely objective 
considerations of their relative eligibility as objects of reference. The most eligible 
attract reference like magnets; and the correct theory of reference uniquely assigns 
the most eligible in any such case. Thus, experiential explanations meeting ED may be 
given even in the context of multiple collocated non-Exclusive objects of perception 
indistinguishable from within the subject’s perceptual perspective at a given time. 
For these uniquely track the spatio-temporal trajectory of the most eligible such item.
14 These brief comments place me firmly on Travis’s side in his debate with McDowell as this is played 
out in their two contributions to the present anthology.
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Recall again my position in the Festival Hall listening to the Philharmonia. There are 
many events going on in exactly the same place before me now. These include at least 
the following: the Philharmonia’s performance of Beethoven 3; their performance of 
its first movement; their Europe-wide Beethoven cycle and the RFH multi-orchestra 
cycle of Beethoven symphonies. Each of these offers quite different experiential oppor-
tunities for various specific spatio-temporal routes through the world. ED may be 
satisfied in spite of this provided that one of these events is objectively most eligible 
as the unique reference of my current perceptual demonstrative indication of what 
I am witnessing there now: perhaps the Philharmonia’s performance of the whole of 
Beethoven 3. Thus, the core claim of reference magnetism is ideally suited to imple-
ment the current line of objection to my overall argument. ED is compatible with the 
denial of Exclusivity.
This strikes me as an unstable position, or else a notational variant of my own NCV. 
The official metaphysics postulates many (perhaps indefinitely many) multiply nested 
persisting individuals all in exactly the same place at a time. The theory of perceptual 
demonstrative thought that is conjoined with it essentially depends on the existence in 
every case of a unique objectively privileged element of this nested set, eligible to serve 
as the determinate explanatory ground of perceptual experience over time. This is 
metaphysical multiplicity always and everywhere masquerading, so far as our explana-
tory thought and talk is concerned, precisely as the natural unity characteristic of 
NCV Natural Continuants. Put another way, the idea of natural mind-independent 
reference magnets is an excellent one. Those serving as the basic referents in our explan-
ations of the course of our experience by appeal to the persisting macroscopic material 
objects that we perceive and our spatio-temporal route through the world are precisely 
the Natural Continuants proposed by NCV. In the absence of such a systematic meta-
physical foundation, the appeal to reference magnetism strikes me as an optimistic 
brute assertion of the compatibility that I reject of ED with the denial of Exclusivity.
According to NCV, whenever I encounter non-Exclusive Artificial Continuants 
in perception, these are necessarily grounded on Exclusive Natural Continuants 
that serve as the basic referents of my simple perceptual demonstratives. Only if it 
mirrors this picture will the appeal to reference magnetism succeed in preserving ED. 
Without the systematic grounding proposal, the current objector’s proposal is unstable. 
With it, it is close to a notational variant of NCV, highlighting the important 
idea that simple perceptual demonstrative reference gravitates towards Exclusive 
Natural Continuants.
I have considered two lines of objection to my claim that ED depends upon the 
Exclusivity that is characteristic of NCV Natural Continuants. Sortalism attempts to 
induce ED upon a non-Exclusive domain by appeal to conceptual distinctions within 
the subject’s perspective. But this is incompatible with the crucial foundational role of 
the simple explanatory scheme in application directly to perceptual experience itself, 
unadorned by any subsequent theoretical-conceptual categorization. So the objection 
fails. Reference magnetism seeks to induce ED upon the non-Exclusive domain by 
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appeal to the unique objective eligibility of one amongst many collocated objects of 
perception to serve as the referent at a time in our explanations of the course of our 
experience over time. If this is to be an objection to my argument, then it must reject 
the characteristic NCV idea of a basic domain of Exclusive Natural Continuants 
grounding non-Exclusive Artificial Continuants. But in that case the appeal to refer-
ence magnetism in order to preserve ED is without the necessary metaphysical basis. 
So again the objection fails.
4.3 Spatial Parts
My argument for the essential role of Exclusive Natural Continuants in our most basic 
explanations of the course of our perceptual experience over time rests on the failure of 
ED that results from attempting to appeal only to non-Exclusive events and Artificial 
Continuant temporal parts instead. The basic problem is that I encounter a nested 
multiplicity of collocated such things of varying temporal extents at any given time in 
perception and therefore fail to identify on the basis of such perception alone anything 
that has determinate experiential implications for any specific route through the world 
that I may take over time. The recognition of a basic domain of Exclusive Natural 
Continuants amongst the persisting material objects that we encounter in perception 
precisely avoids this problem. For there cannot be two such things in exactly the same 
place at any given time yet which extend differentially through time: if o and o’ are 
Natural Continuants and there is a time at which they precisely occupy the same 
spatial extent, then o = o’.
Still, it may be objected that a parallel problem does remain in connection with 
spatial extent at a time even within the domain of Natural Continuants. So, either the 
failure of Exclusivity is not the fundamental source of the explanatory problem in 
connection with events and Artificial Continuants, or my argument that there is a 
pressing explanatory problem here at all is mistaken. This objection takes a little 
stage-setting.
To begin with, note that Exclusivity implies that Natural Continuants have no 
Natural Continuant proper temporal parts. For suppose that n is a Natural Continuant 
proper temporal part of a Natural Continuant N and that n exists at time t. It follows 
that N and n precisely occupy the same spatial extent at t. Hence N = n by Exclusivity. 
Yet n is a proper part of N. Hence N ≠ n. This is a contradiction. So Natural Continuants 
have no Natural Continuant proper temporal parts. On the other hand, Natural 
Continuants plausibly do have some Natural Continuant proper spatial parts. Although 
some of the proper spatial parts of Natural Continuants are Artificial Continuants that 
result from some kind of abstraction by spatial partition, such as the whole of Tibbles 
the cat except for its tail, other proper spatial parts are plausibly themselves Natural 
Continuants, whose unity, both at a time and over time, are entirely independent of 
our concepts and activities, and that themselves meet the Exclusivity Condition. In 
what follows I presume that its individual (attached) leaves are such Natural 
Continuant proper parts of a Natural Continuant tree.
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Suppose now that I encounter a tree, T, with two attached leaves, L1 and L2. It is 
straightforward to generate failures of ED in connection with what I encounter in 
perception now. L1 may fall to the ground in one minute; L2 may blow off in two 
minutes and eventually come to rest one mile away. The experiential implications of 
various spatio-temporal routes through the world are quite different in connection 
with each of these. Remaining exactly where I am, I eventually lose sight of L2 after 
three minutes, say, as it disappears into the distance; I may or may not continue to 
perceive L1 depending on exactly where it falls to the ground in relation to trunk of 
T and my line of sight; T remains in view as it decreases twice in size losing L1 and L2 in 
turn until it is bare. Supposing that I do lose sight of L1 as it falls, I need only move 
around T to perceive it again, and to see it change over time from green to brown. The 
route that I have to take to keep track of L2 is more extended and following it has 
the consequence of my losing sight first of L1 and then eventually of T.
According to ED, given any specific trajectory taken over time by what I perceive 
before me now, my own spatio-temporal route through the world uniquely determines 
(in conjunction with my satisfaction of the relevant attentional and other enabling 
conditions on perception) whether or not I previously encountered that very thing in 
perception, or will do so again in the future, or would do so in certain counterfactual 
circumstances. I perceive T, L1, and L2 before me now. Yet various routes that I may take 
through the world yield inconsistent answers to the question whether I perceive these 
very things again: ‘yes’, ‘possibly’, ‘no’, as I remain where I am; ‘no’, ‘no’, ‘yes’, as I follow 
L2 to the end of its journey. Even Exclusivity fails to secure ED in general. So my 
 argument is again under threat.
The key to my reply to this objection is a distinction between what is there before me 
at any given time and what I actively encounter in perception at that time as modulated 
by the scale and direction of my spatial attention. First, though, I must stress that only 
very few and specific proper spatial parts of Natural Continuants are themselves 
Natural Continuants. Plausible candidates are certain organs of animals, and their 
individual teeth, say; and the leaves and fruit of certain plants. Most of the proper spa-
tial parts of Natural Continuants are Artificial Continuants abstracted from them by 
some form of spatial partition. Given this, the range of distinct Natural Continuants 
before me at any given time is normally quite limited, and these are normally quite 
straightforwardly distinguished by their relative size and/or position. Thus, in the toy 
case of the tree and its two leaves above, T is very significantly larger than L1 and L2, 
each of which has a different position on T’s branches. So, faced with T and its L1 and L2 
Natural Continuant proper parts, I may be attending specifically to any of them. 
Suppose that I am attending to T. Then what I encounter remains in view as it loses its 
leaves, provided that I stay where I am, and gradually disappears out of view as I run 
away following L2, say. On the other hand, taking the latter route myself, I precisely 
succeed in keeping track of what I encounter in experience there before me if we sup-
pose that I am currently attending instead to L2. Similarly there are different determin-
ate experiential implications again of attending instead to L1.
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In general, then, I claim that consideration of the scale and direction of spatial 
attention is normally sufficient to reinstate ED for any specific spatio-temporal route 
through the world. The simple principle that the course and nature of my experience 
over time is jointly determined by the very things that I (attentively) encounter in 
perception there before me and my spatio-temporal route through the world therefore 
normally applies. So the existence of some Natural Continuant proper spatial parts 
of  Natural Continuants is no threat to my argument that Exclusive NCV Natural 
Continuants are fundamental to our most basic understanding and explanation of the 
course of our perceptual experience of the world around us over time as we trace a 
continuous spatio-temporal route through what we find in the world.15
An analogous temporal attentional strategy does not succeed in reinstating ED in 
connection with non-Exclusive objects of perception such as events. First, in contrast 
with their current spatial extent, it is plausibly indeterminate at a given time how long 
the various events that are perceived at that time may continue. For example, Esa Pekka 
Salonen may not yet have decided how expansively to take the Funeral March or how 
much to drive the Scherzo in the current performance of Beethoven 3. So any role of 
temporal attention in uniquely determining a single object of current perception must 
exploit an appropriate sortal categorization—attending to the whole of this perform-
ance of Beethoven 3, for example, rather than the event consisting of that performance 
and the subsequent applause, say. In which case, the objection that I gave to sortalism 
above, that it is incompatible with the foundational role of the simple explanatory 
scheme in our thinking about the mind-independent world around us, applies equally 
in this case. Second, in contrast with the case of the Exclusive Natural Continuant 
proper parts of Natural Continuants, a given temporal extent does not uniquely deter-
mine one amongst the many collocated event-objects that I am perceiving in the 
Festival Hall. Perhaps the Philharmonia’s Europe-wide Beethoven cycle will end at 
exactly the same time as the RFH multi-orchestra cycle. Temporal attentional extent 
fails to reinstate ED; similarly in more realistic cases for the present proposal of much 
shorter-lasting events. So, again, the analogy with my appeal to spatial attention above 
breaks down. ED does indeed depend on the Exclusivity of NCV Natural Continuants.
4.4 Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind
Finally, I end with a question. How can ideas from philosophy of mind seriously 
constrain our metaphysics? How can claims about the way in which we register the 
mind-independence of the objects of perception determine the correct metaphysics 
for those very objects themselves?
My answer is that metaphysics is not simply an empty game of consistency and 
the minimization of some abstract notion of counter-intuitiveness. These tools for 
15 If every Natural Continuant had a Natural Continuant proper spatial part attentively indistinguish-
able from it—all the way down, as it were—then the existence of such Natural Continuants alone would be 
insufficient to secure the robust application of the ED response to Berkeley’s challenge. I have already 
explained that this is not the case according to NCV as I understand it.
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metaphysical theory selection have to be directed at a specific domain. A metaphysical 
investigation into the nature of Xs, that is to say, has to be directed and controlled by 
some provisional understanding at least of which things the Xs are. In the case of the 
nature of the familiar persisting macroscopic material objects around us, this con-
straint comes at least in part from their nature as the evidently mind-independent 
objects that we encounter in perception. And I claim that this is a matter of their being 
the objects to which we appeal as the ED explanatory grounds of the order and nature 
of our experience of such things over time.
An error theory is always a possibility, as in some versions of the standard account 
of the secondary qualities.16 But this requires an independent argument that the world 
could not possibly contain objects of the kind required by our initial controlling 
conception. Although this is clearly a major topic in its own right that I cannot possibly 
address here, I am yet to be convinced by any such argument in the present case. Thus, 
I offer an argument from the premise that the familiar persisting material objects that 
we encounter in perception are evidently independent of our perceptions of them 
to  the conception of these proposed by NCV. Perhaps less ambitiously, I conclude 
at the very least that NCV is essential to ED explanations of our experience of the 
mind-independent world over time.17
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